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This article looks at the work of Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann on
decentralisation and village governance in Indonesia.1 It discusses the main findings
of their magnum opus ‘Political and Legal Transformations of an Indonesian Polity:
The Nagari from Colonisation to Decentralisation’. Compared to other regions, West
Sumatra presents a unique case, as it translated the post-Suharto decentralisation into
a return to a traditional customary (adat) government structure  the nagari. How can
we explain such an unusual turn, which happened nowhere else in Indonesia? This
question is relevant to current political debates in Indonesia following the enactment
of the 2014 Village Law. That Law explicitly presents the option for a return to adat
structures in other regions as well, while granting villages more autonomy. Our
central question is whether the same factors that promoted the ‘return to the nagari’
are likely to facilitate a similar process elsewhere in Indonesia. What can
practitioners, policy-makers and researchers engaged in the latest wave of village
governance transformations in Indonesia learn from the experiences in West Sumatra?
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Introduction
Since the 1990s, decentralisation took off worldwide as part of a neo-liberal agenda
promoted by international institutions as the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). A particularly
dramatic case of decentralisation  described by one World Bank official as a ‘Big Bang’
 took place in Indonesia after the fall of Suharto, who had ruled the country in a central-
ised, authoritarian manner for more than 30 years. In 1999, just one year after the regime
change and under strong political pressure from reformers, two laws on decentralisation
were enacted (22/1999 and 25/1999). They granted a high degree of autonomy to the dis-
tricts and subsidiary authority to the provinces. The central government would only retain
powers in the field of monetary matters, defence, foreign affairs, justice and religion.
The result in practice was not as sweeping as it looked on paper, but the new system
was nonetheless far removed from the centralised structure of the Suharto regime. The
centre of governmental gravity moved considerably downward and many Jakarta-watch-
ers followed suit (Schulte Nordholt and Van Klinken 2007). Yet, few looked beyond
provinces, districts, and towns to see what happened at the village level.
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Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann were the main exception. Their effort led to
the magnum opus ‘Political and Legal Transformations of an Indonesian Polity: The
nagari from Colonisation to Decentralisation’ (F. von Benda-Beckmann and K. von
Benda-Beckmann 2013). This unique study provides an in-depth and long-term analysis
of village government and the different actors shaping it under changing governance
regimes. It looks at all levels of government, but always relates what it finds there to what
actually occurred in the villages of West Sumatra.2 Regional autonomy provided provin-
cial and district governments the freedom to implement new legislation concerning local
governance according to their own style and culture, and the Minangkabau of West
Sumatra used this opportunity to the full.
The book is the crown on a lifelong interest in village governance, property relations
and legal pluralism. These three subjects cannot be considered separately and run like a
common thread through the work of the von Benda-Beckmanns. In the 1970s, Franz
started with research in West Sumatra that focused on property relationships (F. von
Benda-Beckmann 1979), whereas Keebet concentrated on village justice and state courts
in the same region (K. von Benda-Beckmann 1984). They continued combining these
themes wherever they went, which resulted in a long list of publications. The opportunity
they had in the 1980s to do field research in Ambon, in the Moluccas, further contributed
to their insights into Indonesian local government, as it enabled them to compare the two
regions (F. von Benda-Beckmann and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1994).
In 2001, the von Benda-Beckmanns returned to West Sumatra. Feeling the atmo-
sphere of change and listening to the debates about decentralisation they seized the oppor-
tunity to conduct a study with a truly long time span: they started an inquiry into the
transformations of local governance after the start of the decentralisation process and fol-
lowed the developments for over a decade. In 2013, just after Franz had passed away, the
results were published in the book mentioned above.
The present article takes as its point of departure ‘Political and Legal Transfor-
mations of an Indonesian Polity’, which comprises a major part of Franz’s research
in Indonesia. Instead of presenting a review (Hadiprayitno 2014; Isra 2014) or a cri-
tique, we summarise and use its findings to look for answers to two questions about
decentralisation, law and governance in Indonesia. The first considers the findings of
the von Benda-Beckmanns in a national perspective. What are the main characteris-
tics of Minangkabau village governance and is the nagari a model for village gover-
nance that can be applied in other parts of Indonesia? To answer this question, we
will make comparisons between West Sumatra and other regions  notably Sumba
in the province of East Nusa Tenggara, which has been the focus of research of one
of the authors since the 1980s (Vel 2008). The second question concerns the new
Indonesian Village Law (6/2014) that was promulgated in January 2014. This Law
opens up opportunities for change that seem modelled on what actually happened in
West Sumatra. It allows for the return to  or recreation of  a village model
rooted in adat, which is potentially better embedded in local social conditions than
the Java-centred model imposed uniformly throughout Indonesia by the New Order’s
Village Law of 1979. Particularly relevant here is the last part of the new Village
Law, which deals with the ‘desa adat’, where the drafters were reportedly inspired
by the example of the nagari of West Sumatra.3 According to Article 96, in relevant
cases ‘the government, provincial government, and the district/municipal government
regulate an adat law community and establish it as an Adat Village (desa adat)’.
The von Benda-Beckmanns’ book on village governance could not have been better
timed in this respect, and our question is accordingly what researchers, practitioners
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and policy-makers engaged in implementing this new law can learn from their
findings?
Characteristics of changing village governance in West Sumatra
Compared with the effects of the post-Suharto decentralisation on other Indonesian areas,
West Sumatra presents a unique case. The Minangkabau translated the new opportunities
into a return to the past, to what might seem an old-fashioned customary governmental
structure. Four major factors account for this unusual result: the strength of customary
institutions; the resilience of the existing structures despite central government efforts at
administrative fragmentation; several push factors that helped restoring the nagari; and
support from higher government levels and religious leaders. We will start by considering
these factors in some detail.
The strength of customary institutions
When in the 1970s the von Benda-Beckmanns conducted research in West Sumatra, vil-
lages were just settling back into the colonial indirect rule pattern that had existed for
many decades before the Japanese occupation, national revolution and a West Sumatran
rebellion interfered with it. Villages were called nagari; they were divided into approxi-
mately seven wards, and three to four times larger than the Javanese desa. The nagari
were both territorial and social units, in which the nagari community regulated land ten-
ure, property, and social relations. Communal land property and communal inheritance
rules along matrilineal lines were important characteristics of this system. Originally
these customary institutions were adapted to the agrarian system of wet rice and cash
crop cultivation, safeguarding the availability of labour and land for rice cultivation, rules
of distribution within the nagari and preventing alienation of the nagari’s natural resour-
ces (F. von Benda-Beckmann and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1994). Later, the complex of
customary institutions became the foundation for communal claims to land that was
appropriated by the state for plantations or mining. Keeping up the old structures of the
nagari with its assets (pusako) and common lands (ulayat) thus supported the contempo-
rary economic interests of the Minangkabau versus the central state.
The backbone of the nagari consisted of several lineages and sub-lineages, which
administered the lineage land. The administration was dualistic, with a ‘state’ side  rep-
resented in the mayor, the village council, the village council of representatives and the
village adat council. The adat councils (not to be confused with the village adat council)
consisted of the lineage heads. Although not an official part of the village administration,
they administered the village commons and often competed with the mayor when it con-
cerned decision-making in disputes over lineage land (F. von Benda-Beckmann and K.
von Benda-Beckmann 2013, 117119). This was a crucial mechanism of checks and bal-
ances which could prevent elite appropriation of public wealth.
Besides having these strong traditional customary institutions, the nagari turned out to
be able to adapt to new demands of representative government as well after they were
reinstated. In the period covered by the von Benda-Beckmanns’ research, adat leaders
were always represented in the village parliament and many mayors were at the same
time adat leaders. Apparently, most of them managed to divide their respective functions
in this respect (F. von Benda-Beckmann and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2013, 435). Over
time, the state apparatus expanded into the nagari through the establishment of its own
municipal administration, schools, health centres, police, extension services and
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cooperatives. The hybridisation of political and economic structures indicates how ‘the
nagari evolved into socio-political spaces in which village and state structures and person-
nel merged’ (F. von Benda-Beckmann and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2013, 423). Current
election rules support free and fair elections by the entire adult nagari population. Alto-
gether, nagari have become more democratic than they were ever before (F. von Benda-
Beckmann and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2013, 433). Newly established religious institu-
tions have further completed the triangle of state-adat-religion.
Resilience despite central government efforts at administrative fragmentation
Changing policies of the national government affected the autonomy of village govern-
ments and their claims on customary, communal property. Characteristic for the authori-
tarian national regime in the period 19651998 was the attempt to progressively
subordinate villages to higher levels of government. This policy extended to the adat-side
of government. In the context of anti-communist activities in 1965 and under the pressure
of the army, the Association of Minangkabau Adat Councils (LKAAM) was established
as an umbrella organisation for controlling adat institutions. Their ‘main function was to
cleanse village governments of communists and replace them with “innocent” clan mem-
bers’ (F. von Benda-Beckmann and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2013, 116). An important
consequence of the increasing state control over adat councils was that the latter lost
much of their legitimacy. Through Presidential Decree 32/1979 on the Conversion of
‘Western Rights’ into State Land, the state appropriated village commons by determining
that land which had been leased out to private companies would not return to its adat sta-
tus after the lease had expired, but would become state land instead (F. von Benda-Beck-
mann and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2013, 123).
A decisive step towards centralisation was the enactment of Law 5/1979. This statute
introduced a uniform system of village government across Indonesia, using the Javanese
desa structure as a model. The means to convince provinces to collaborate were financial:
development grants from the central government were provided to villages irrespective of
their size, which meant in the case of West Sumatra that splitting the nagari multiplied
their funding by a factor of seven (F. von Benda-Beckmann and K. von Benda-Beckmann
2013, 130).
The administrative consequence of splitting the nagari was that the jurisdiction of the
adat council no longer corresponded to the village territory. To overcome this problem,
the West Sumatra provincial government decided to formalise the informal: it declared
the nagari a special ‘adat law community’ under the authority of the adat council (Pro-
vincial Regulations 7/1981 and 13/1983). Except for deciding disputes involving adat,
these councils were officially charged with administering the ‘nagari wealth’  most
importantly the administration of the nagari commons. Nonetheless, their authority
declined relative to the village heads, who administered increasingly large funds from the
central government for development projects.
Moreover, in practice large parts of the commons were administered by the Depart-
ment of Forestry and none of the revenues went to the adat councils. This mismatch in
state and adat authority made land management a complex affair (F. von Benda-Beck-
mann and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2013, 133136). In the 1990s, ‘it was asserted that
the desa had destroyed the nagari, causing disorientation that robbed all content from tra-
ditional symbolic forms of adat authority’ (Zakaria 2000). According to the von Benda-
Beckmanns, this was an overstatement. No one would disagree that the shift to the desa
system had caused serious problems and that land issues had become more complex due
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to the increasing role of the state in the village and the many legal changes, (F. von
Benda-Beckmann and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2013, 149152). However, adat showed
remarkable resilience throughout the period after 1979 and ‘adat logic dominated not
only among villagers but often within courts and even the administration as well’ (F. von
Benda-Beckmann and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2013, 151).
Push factors in restoring the nagari
The general feeling of discontent helps explain the positive response to the 1999
Decentralisation Laws in West Sumatra, when the province quickly adapted its struc-
tures to the new situation (F. von Benda-Beckmann and K. von Benda-Beckmann
2013, 163). The process did not always proceed smoothly. Just as in other provinces,
it was accompanied by the splitting of districts, by civil society taking action against
corrupt politicians, and by conflicts between the province, districts and the national
government about natural resource control (F. von Benda-Beckmann and K. von
Benda-Beckmann 2013, 166175). Yet, on balance the process of decentralisation
has been remarkably successful in West Sumatra (F. von Benda-Beckmann and
K. von Benda-Beckmann 2013, 182).
The issue of a return to the nagari was raised even before the Decentralisation Laws
were passed: in 1998, Governor Muchlis Ibrahim publicly launched the idea of restoring
the nagari. He was wise enough to also commission an inquiry to test how much support
he could expect for such a step. Perhaps surprisingly, the results made clear that such sup-
port was not overwhelming, as many villagers valued the proximity of the desa govern-
ment and found that public infrastructure had improved considerably under the desa
administration. At the same time, the report found that many villagers complained that
‘adat had been destroyed’. Reinstalling the nagari, these villagers argued, could restore
adat. However, few people had a clear idea what a nagari actually meant, and young
intellectuals warned against returning to ‘backward’ institutions of the past (F. von
Benda-Beckmann and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2013, 189).
In the next two years, public opinion turned around, and support for the return to the
nagari became more or less consensus. According to the von Benda-Beckmanns (2013,
189), this had little to do with new insights. It was foremost the result from a process that
had passed the point of no return. The way the media propagated the return to the nagari,
combined with hopes that this would somehow resolve all problems, changed the project
from a top-down initiative into one ‘owned’ by the common Minangkabau. Perhaps the
fact that few understood what a nagari meant in practice reinforced the zeal with which
they pursued the new form of government. This equally applied to many individual gov-
ernors and district heads, who continued to be the main drivers of the process.
Another push factor was the presence of foreign donors and NGOs which engaged in
capacity building for decentralisation as an administrative process. The former were
heavily involved in the decentralisation process anyway, and some of them took up a role
in the nagari project as well. Their influence varied considerably and many of their
actions were not particularly effective, but in an indirect way they contributed to the proj-
ect by bringing together stakeholders such as mayors, adat council members, district
heads and others. The networks that were thus established considerably smoothed the
project. NGOs at several levels provided important input to the debates. Notably absent
was the indigenous peoples movement led by AMAN (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusan-
tara, National Alliance of Adat Communities), which played an important role in the
political debates about decentralisation in many parts of Indonesia, but was hardly active
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in West Sumatra (F. von Benda-Beckmann and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2013, 429). The
most obvious explanation is that adat in West Sumatra has always remained so strong
that there was no need for an organisation like AMAN to champion its interests.
A major precondition for the return to the nagari to succeed was the introduction in
2005 of a system of government financing that no longer made it attractive to stick to the
desa as a unit. Before 2005, most desa obtained the bulk of their income from financial
support from the national, district and provincial government and in the shape of projects
financed with special development funds (Dana Alokasi Khusus (DAK)). The former was
usually sufficient only for routine expenditures (F. von Benda-Beckmann and K. von
Benda-Beckmann 2013, 433), the latter are earmarked. There were other sources of fund-
ing, own income from taxes, levies and royalties from commons and markets, and gifts
and contributions from third parties (for example from emigrants to their home village),
but these seldom outweighed the importance from the first two (F. von Benda-Beckmann
and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2013, 433). With the implementation of GR 72/2005, all
desa became entitled to receive a village fund grant from the district government, and the
regulation (art. 68) stipulated that at least 10% of the regional transfer budget should be
spent on this village fund allocation (Alokasi Dana Desa (ADD)). The distribution of
ADD among units of local government became proportional. Nagari with a size larger
than the previous desa they included would receive a proportional higher amount. How-
ever, reliance on increasing amounts of ADD means that the autonomy of the nagari
remained a relative matter.
And finally, Minangkabau emigrants played an important role in the process. The
Minangkabau people are renowned for their high level of education and good connections
to government networks. Whereas some 4.5 million people reside in the province, around
1.5 million Minangkabau live in other parts of Indonesia, and many of them occupy influ-
ential positions. The nagari and its ulayat land are key symbols of Minangkabau ethnic
identity in areas where the emigrants reside among other ethnic groups. Especially these
Minangkabau regarded the New Order’s imposition of the desa as an act of reprehensible
standardisation or even as Javanese colonialism. The return to the nagari thus became a
way of restoring ethnic pride (F. von Benda-Beckmann and K. von Benda-Beckmann
2013, 382).
Support from higher government levels and religious leaders
Some important issues had to be regulated by the provincial and the district governments,
which played a pioneering role in providing legislation for new village structures. For
example, the relation between the mayor and village parliament with the adat council,
and the related question who would be in charge of managing the nagari commons,
required district or even provincial regulation (F. von Benda-Beckmann and K. von
Benda-Beckmann 2013, 190192). The support of West Sumatra higher government lev-
els for the return to the nagari was, therefore, indispensable.
Law 22/1999 opened the possibility to adapt the name for a village from the uniform
desa to the name that was customarily given to this government unit in the region con-
cerned. It also defined the standard arrangement of village institutions, but indicated that
further adaptations would be facilitated by central government guidelines (pedoman) and
district regulations. However, these government guidelines were not yet in place. The
province of West Sumatra was well aware of its lack of authority in this field, but none-
theless drafted a Framework Regulation on Village Government (9/2000) (F. von Benda-
Beckmann and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2013, 192193). This regulation was to define
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the course of the process by deciding some important questions regarding the form, struc-
ture and boundaries of nagari. The province thus became the main driver of the process,
without any formal power. Such a development was of course only possible because the
districts were willing to go along, but it is highly unlikely that on their own the latter
would have acted as decisively.
The process was further facilitated by the special relation between adat and religion in
West Sumatra. This relation has always amazed anthropologists, because the Minangka-
bau people combine an adat system of matrilocal and matrilineal inheritance with Islam,
whereas common Islamic doctrine is based on a patrilocal, patrilineal society. What hap-
pened was that the renewed emphasis on adat in West Sumatra was accompanied by a
renewed emphasis on Islam, but this remained limited to the legal-moral sphere and had
no effects on the structure of governance (F. von Benda-Beckmann and K. von Benda-
Beckmann 2013, 424). The traditional balance between adat and religion turned out to
have deep roots, which prevented a conflict along these lines. The main reason that Islam
did not become a force for change towards a more patrilineal system is that this would
destroy the matrilineal system. Deeply rooted in localities this system constitutes the core
of Minangkabau identity and replacing it is the last thing most Minangkabau would wish
to happen (F. von Benda-Beckmann and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2013, 418419). As a
result, the return to the nagari was also supported by religious authorities.
Resistance and conflict
Further steps towards realising the nagari were mainly left to the nagari to be. This meant
that they could themselves determine who would be the interim mayor, how the debates
about representation and other matters were conducted, but also how the elections were
organised. While on the one hand this freedom allowed for maximum flexibility and
‘ownership’, it did have exclusionary effects in some places where migrants were pre-
vented from participating in the process (F. von Benda-Beckmann and K. von Benda-
Beckmann 2013, 224).
Adat leaders often took the lead in the reunification process of desa into a nagari, even
if in the end it was up to the district to approve of the new unity (F. von Benda-Beckmann
and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2013, 433). The return to the nagari went relatively
smoothly because in most cases it was possible to return to the original boundaries. None-
theless, changes in number and constellation of the population made several desa reluc-
tant to go along and some serious controversies regarding the establishment of new
nagari emerged. Desa with a migrant majority felt little inclination to once again become
subservient to the nagari they originally belonged to. If these immigrants were sufficient
in number, ingenious constructions allowed them to form their own nagari in conformity
with the adat rules, but conflicts ensued in cases where this was not possible or where the
adat council resisted such a development. This demonstrates the power adat still wields,
at least as a source of authority, for only seldom did reluctant desa get their way. Within
villages, some inhabitants resisted the renewed emphasis on adat, as it reduced the status
they had gained under the desa system, but seldom to any effect (F. von Benda-Beckmann
and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2013, 220).
A major issue of controversy in the transition process was the management of the
nagari wealth. It was not only a matter internal to the nagari  between mayor and vil-
lage parliament on the one hand and the adat council on the other  but also one between
the nagari and the district, and between West Sumatra and the central government. The
latter was particularly acrimonious, as the central government refused to go along with
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the demand that communal land would return to the adat regime after a long lease to a
plantation or mining company had expired. The National Land Agency insisted that com-
munal adat land had been ‘released’ from this status before it could be leased out under a
state law regime, and that upon the expiration of the term the land would automatically
become state land. After a protracted struggle, West Sumatra enacted Provincial Regula-
tion 16/2008, which contained the ambiguous phrase that ‘after expiration of state-
derived use rights, the land reverts back to its earlier status’. This phrasing is at odds with
Minister of Agrarian Affairs’ Regulation 5/1999, which defines as a condition for recog-
nition of rights to communal land that it has never been leased out under a state law
regime. In short, the dispute has not been resolved and this contest will continue (F. von
Benda-Beckmann and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2013, 356).
There was also conflict of interest between the nagari and the district. State officials
and the district parliament usually supported plantation companies because they depended
on revenues from the companies for their own income. For example, in 2000, the govern-
ment of Pasaman district received nearly 58% of its total budget from oil palm companies
(F. von Benda-Beckmann and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2013, 309). Under such political-
economic conditions, district governments often refused to give up the income from leas-
ing out land or other natural resources for exploitation. It seems that whether this issue
gets resolved varies from case to case. Conflicts about the control of income from market
exploitation have usually ended in favour of the district government. Likewise, nagari
had to accept that they hold only subsidiary powers of taxation and thus depend on the
district for how much income they obtain in this manner (F. von Benda-Beckmann and
K. von Benda-Beckmann 2013, 292).
In some cases, district heads demonstrated a profound distrust of adat leaders, whom
they found poorly educated and more concerned with their private wealth than with the
common good (F. von Benda-Beckmann and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2013, 198). This
has resulted in efforts to reinforce the position of the mayor and the village parliament
vis-a-vis the adat council and partly as a result the adat councils have usually lost their
control of the village commons.4
What makes West Sumatra special?
Why did the Decentralisation Law of 1999 lead to reinstalling ‘updated’ customary forms
of village government in West Sumatra, and why did that not happen in other regions?
An obvious answer is that West Sumatra strongly adheres to its adat, but so do some other
regions.
The first explanation is that in many parts of Indonesia, old adat structures had ceased
to exist. In some places, the effects of Village Law 5/1979 have been far more destructive
than in West Sumatra. A case to illustrate this point is Rejang Lebong in the province of
Bengkulu (South Sumatra), where the authority of the marga, a supra-desa institution
under a pasirah created by the Dutch in 1860, eroded in a long process that already started
under the Dutch (Galizia 1996). After independence, the powers of the pasirah were
taken away one after the other, which caused the last pasirah under the New Order to
become thoroughly corrupt. Few locals, therefore, resented the abolition of the marga
and the pasirah by the 1979 Village Law  until it turned out that with the marga its com-
mons had disappeared as well. These had been transferred to the central state instead of to
the desa. The desa had virtually no remaining sources of income, which undermined the
position of the desa head. Over time, many locals moreover started to resent the loss of
adat as a source of social cohesion. Even the central government became worried by the
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developments and tried in vain to reinstall adat by new institutions. Arguably, a return to
the marga after 1999 could have reopened the debates about the ownership of the village
commons, but there were no viable marga or potential pasirah anymore to return to.5
A second explanation is that in many places, there is no mismatch between adat and
village territory like there was in West Sumatra after the implementation of the 1979 Vil-
lage Law. An example can be found on Sumba, in East Nusa Tenggara. Just as in West
Sumatra, adat plays an important role in daily life and land governance. In Sumba, the
traditional social division is not in nagari but in relatively autonomous patri-lineages
(kabihu). Powerful lineages could extend their territory of influence and access to labour
by marriage alliances with other lineages. The colonial government selected some among
these powerful lineage heads to become ‘raja’ in the colonial system of indirect rule.
Their territory, the swapraja, comprised adat land of several lineages.
Due to national policy for unifying local governance structures, the swapraja in
Sumba were replaced by kecamatan in 1962 (Kapita 1976, 73). Subsequent division of
the kecamatan into desa reduced the variety in lineages included in the smallest govern-
ment unit. Instead of causing problems, the desa system avoided conflicts between com-
peting clans that had been put together into a single government unit by the colonial
administration. Another explanatory factor is that in Sumba, the tension between the state
government institutions and adat institutions is far less pronounced than in West Sumatra.
Although some Minangkabau hold double positions, the adat and state governance insti-
tutions are parallel authority structures. In Sumba, those authorities are often merged,
because many of the higher rank state officials belong to the local adat elites (Vel 2008).6
That Sumba did seize other opportunities offered by the Decentralisation Law of 1999
confirms that the continuation of the desa structure was not caused by a lack of entrepre-
neurial spirit of the governing elites. The district governments on this island depend for
more than 90% of their income on transfers from the national government. The best strat-
egy for Sumba’s local governments was to split up districts into smaller units (Vel 2007).
This phenomenon could be found all over Indonesia (Aragon 2007; Schulte Nordholt and
Van Klinken 2007).7 The splitting campaign took a long time (also due to a lack of money
for bribing the relevant officials), but eventually it succeeded in 2007, when West Sumba
was divided into three new districts. Due to the formula of fiscal redistribution, the net
benefit resulting from the new situation was a roughly 300% increase in government bud-
get for the same area. This success was followed by new divisions: sub-districts were split
into two, and even many desa were split, in order to direct village funds from the central
government to the own constituency. In some cases, splitting could also help resolve
elite rivalries or depose a corrupt village head (Wetterberg, Dharmawan, and Jellema
2013, 93).
The third explanation is that the ‘return to the nagari’ was a response to specific char-
acteristics which were only present in West Sumatra.8 In the single non-Minangkabau
area of West Sumatra, the Mentawai Islands, decentralisation was considered as an oppor-
tunity to ‘liberate themselves from what they saw as cultural repression and political colo-
nisation by the mainland Minangkabau people’ (Eindhoven 2007, 69). In resource-rich
areas, which in terms of economic development are similar to West Sumatra, the most
prominent issues of decentralisation were substantially different from the ‘return to the
nagari’ pattern. In Central Kalimantan, where decentralisation policies required corporate
interests in the logging sector to start co-operating with local strongmen, and administra-
tive and village elites, the exercise of public power over nature was the main issue
(McCarthy 2007, 153). In the ethnically diverse province of West Kalimantan restoring
peace after the violent conflicts in 1997 and 1999 dominated the agenda, and led to
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questions on how decentralisation could contribute to this aim (Tanasaldy 2007). In Bali,
decentralisation policies became part of the on-going discussion on how the Balinese
could remain in charge of preserving their culture, religion and environment, while con-
tinuing to draw profits from a tourism industry increasingly based on investments from
Jakarta. Here, decentralisation was partly seen as a threat, because it fragmented political
power against the central state (Schulte Nordholt 2007, 389).
In short, splitting districts and provinces was attractive anywhere in Indonesia because
of the financial benefits it conferred, but other responses depended on the particular cir-
cumstances of the localities involved.
The next section will consider whether the new Village Law brings any change to this
situation and what we can learn about it with the analysis of West Sumatra by the von
Benda-Beckmanns in mind.
Looking fromWest Sumatra at the 2014 Village Law
The new Village Law (6/2014) presents two major novelties: it provides for a substantial
increase in the flow of funds to the village treasury (up to five times as much) and it opens
the possibility to villages to opt for the status of desa adat. We will concentrate on the last
issue, but first we will address the new financial scheme, as this is of relevance for the
choice to become a desa adat.
Increase in village funds and reciprocal paper work
Article 72 of the Village Law stipulates that villages are not only entitled to their share of
ADD, which is 10% of the block grants provided to the districts, but on top of that will
receive an annual grant, the Village Fund (Dana Desa (DD)), from the national gov-
ernment’s budget. The total size of DD will also be 10% of regional transfers, and it is
additional to ADD funds.9 This means a huge increase of the village budgets. In Decem-
ber 2014, the Jokowi Government raised the national budget allocation for the Village
Fund for 2015 to 20 trillion IDR, or almost US$20,000 per village, which according to
the Minister of Finance is still only 1.5% of the regional transfer budget.10 The reason
why the full 10% will not be released this year is that it will take time before all proce-
dures are in place and villages have the capacity to receive, process and report about these
funds in a professional way. The village governments need to include their financial plans
in the five-year village planning documents and before the village parliaments have
approved no money will be released.11
Controls at higher levels have been put into place as well. The flow of money from the
national government allocated for the villages runs from the national treasury to the trea-
sury of the districts and municipalities, by-passing the provincial level. The districts chan-
nel the funds to the villages, ‘within seven days’ according to Government Regulation
(GR) 60/2014 (Art. 16). However, before the money will be released to the district level,
a number of legal documents must be submitted to higher levels of government: (a) a bud-
get that is approved by the district parliament, and (b) a district regulation specifying the
division of the village fund among the district’s villages. The latter is not a free allocation,
but should be calculated using a formula weighing factors including size of the village
population, size of the village territory and extent of poverty (for which at village level
the percentage of villagers with a Social Security Card is used as a proxy). Finally, there
is a factor prioritising allocation to remote and isolated villages, by including measures
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concerning basic service delivery, transportation facilities and the condition of infrastruc-
ture and communication (Art. 12(6)).
Once the flow of funds starts running down, the reporting process will produce a
counter flow of paperwork running up. Twice a year the village head has to submit a
financial report explaining how his government has spent the village fund. There are four
categories of expenditures: (a) costs of village government, (b) village development and
construction, (c) community empowerment, and (d) social purposes (Art. 19(1)). Art. 80
of the Village Law stipulates how planning and setting priorities in villages should take
place in a process of deliberation including the ‘village society’. However, GR 60/2014’s
Article 21 indicates that the main priorities will be determined by the Village Minister.
These are further elaborated by the technical ministries in the form of guidelines
(pedoman) (Art. 21 and 22). The district government should provide technical
instructions, detailing how the guidelines should be implemented in the local context. This
procedure severely limits the village autonomy in deciding on spending the village budget.
The reporting process continues to the next level when the district government makes
a compilation of the village financial reports to account for the way the DD funds have
been spent in the district. This report is to be submitted to the Minister of Finance, with
copies to the Province and several Ministries. The next transfer of money  from the cen-
tral government to the district and from the district to the village  depends on the
approval of the previous period’s reports (Art. 25). This procedure clearly limits
the opportunity for embezzling village funds. However, another consequence is that the
whole system depends on its weakest link, because the district can only account to
the Minister of Finance when all village reports have been approved and handed in. This
is a threatening perspective for areas with low levels of education and poor administrative
capacity. Whereas the allocation formula might prioritise these disadvantaged areas, the
administrative prerequisites for keeping the flow of funds running will be hard to meet.
Who wants to be a desa adat?
The complexity of the system mentioned above is relevant for the question whether it is
attractive for villages to opt for the status of desa adat. From the perspective of the desa,
the autonomy promised by the Village Law is limited by the priorities determined at
higher levels of government and by extensive bureaucratic procedures. Villages are
dependent on the district for approval of their reports and for guidance in dealing with
bureaucratic requirements. This makes it attractive to secure other sources of funding
than the Village Fund, which can be spent according to local preferences. Becoming a
desa adat may provide a way to obtain these when it opens options for earning village
income from exploitation or lease of the commons. From the perspective of the district
government, this choice is less attractive, because it will need all its energy to install the
mechanisms for making the new funding scheme run well. Having to deal with desa who
want to become desa adat will only further complicate their work.
How can a village change into a desa adat? Chapter XIII of the Village Law explains
that the central, provincial and district government together ‘assess an adat law commu-
nity and establish it as a desa adat’. This is done by a district regulation (Art. 98(1)). The
requirements for becoming a desa adat are similar to those defined in Minister of Agrar-
ian Affairs’ Regulation 5/1999: the adat community and its traditional rights must still be
‘alive’, they will be considered in relation to how the community has developed, and they
must be in conformity with the principle of the Indonesian unitary state. In addition, there
must be a feeling of community, there must be adat institutions, adat norms and ‘adat
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wealth’ or ‘adat objects’. The puzzling statement that ‘they will be considered in relation
to how the community has developed’ is explained as meaning that they must be recog-
nised based on the prevailing laws. This seems to indicate that the community must either
have been recognised on the basis of Minister of Agrarian Affairs’ Regulation 5/1999 or
on the basis of another sectoral regulation, which is a condition hardly any adat group in
Indonesia meets at present (Bedner and Van Huis 2008). The additional requirement that
the contents of their norms may not go against human rights may be less difficult to meet.
Still, it is seems illogical that Articles 9698 offer no basis for an independent assess-
ment, so for the time being we will assume that a desa may try to become a desa adat on
the basis of the Village Law only.
This points to another fundamental difference between the case of West Sumatra and
the procedure for establishing a desa adat. In West Sumatra, the return to the nagari con-
cerned a collective process initiated by the province and involving all villages. In prac-
tice, the only possibility for a village to opt out of the nagari scheme was to become part
of a municipality, as a kelurahan. By contrast, the Village Law allows desa and desa adat
to exist alongside each other, even within a single district. The status of a village can also
be changed from a desa into a desa adat and vice-versa. According to Article 100, the ini-
tiative for obtaining the status of desa adat is to be taken by the community concerned.
This reduces the chances for a collective process developing its own dynamics as it
occurred in West Sumatra the way the von Benda-Beckmanns described. Yet, swift
changes from one status to the other are not to be expected.12 Becoming a desa or a desa
adat is a complex matter and the current process of implementing the Village Law will
define the status of a village for a long period.
Another important difference with the nagari is the composition of the village govern-
ment. In West Sumatra, the village government has a hybrid format, with the adat council
and some other institutions added to the democratically elected mayor and village parlia-
ment. The presence of religious institutions and ideological influence has further contrib-
uted to a balance of powers within the nagari. This is not the format for desa adat.
Articles 107111 of the Village Law provide for a full return to the adat system, without
putting into place clear safeguards for democratic procedures. The hybrid system in place
in West Sumatra can be attained in another way, as Article 95 opens the possibility to
establish a ‘village adat institution’. As a result, a village does not have to become a full
desa adat in order to establish a role for adat in village government. Many villages that
have been organised for decades now on the basis of the national law may opt for Article
95 instead of making the U-turn into a desa adat.
Given the complexities involved in creating desa adat, the benefits should be consid-
erable before a village even starts considering the effort. For some individual villages, the
wish to maintain and reinforce their adat may be sufficient, with the restoration being an
identity marker for the community involved, but in most cases this will probably not be
enough. The key provision is Article 103 under b, which attributes desa adat the authority
to manage their commons, based on their ‘right of origin’ (hak asal-usul). This indeed
provides a good reason for wishing to become a desa adat. AMAN (the National Associa-
tion of Indigenous Communities) expects that all villages located in forest areas will try to
register as desa adat because this will support their claims on forest land. Put more gener-
ally, the higher the value of the land, the more attractive it is to villages to become a desa
adat. And here we may learn from West Sumatra, which has demonstrated how difficult
it is to obtain recognition of the status of land already used for commercial purposes as
still belonging to the commons. Becoming a desa adat is not more than a single step
towards getting recognition of ownership over the commons. Whether many villages are
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willing and able to make that step given all the hurdles involved is highly uncertain. If we
look at the experiences with adat law communities that tried to obtain recognition based
on Minister of Agrarian Affairs’ Regulation 5/1999, the prospects are not very positive.
Conclusion
The work of Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann on village government in West
Sumatra is unmatched in its length, breadth and depth. No other scholar working on Indo-
nesia has ever produced a book like ‘The Political and Legal Transformation’ and it is
unlikely that anyone will ever match it. Since this article focused on the village govern-
ment side of the book, it has failed to do justice to what the study has to offer on the
related subjects of dispute settlement, property relations, inheritance and religion. None-
theless, we hope to have made clear that ‘The Political and Legal Transformation’ is of
particular relevance for the research that will be conducted in the coming years on the for-
mation of desa adat based on the enactment of the new Village Law in 2014.
Seen from a national perspective, the ‘return to the nagari’ presents a highly a-typical
case of how a region seized the new legal repertoire pertaining to village organisation and
relations with the state for its own purpose. West Sumatra restored the nagari as the basic
village structure and managed to safeguard this institution as the central component of
the social and legal complex of pusako-nagari-ulayat in which for centuries the Minang-
kabau have organised their social and property relations. If one takes into account its idio-
syncratic character, it is strange that ‘the return to the nagari became a prime example
nationwide of successful decentralisation at the lowest level of administration’ (F. von
Benda-Beckmann and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2013, 4).
Our preliminary conclusions about the potential of the new Village Law to set into
motion processes similar to the ‘return to the nagari’ are sceptical. It seems to us that the
process in West Sumatra was unique and will never be replicated. The fact that other
regions did not seize the opportunities for restoring older village government structures
after the decentralisation process started in 1999 points in the same direction. The combi-
nation of a mismatch between administrative and adat governance structures, an entrepre-
neurial governor taking the initiative, the importance of the nagari as an identity marker
and the continued existence of viable adat structures were among the many factors that
produced a most remarkable return to the centuries’ old path of slow evolution of village
institutions.
In summary, the main lesson of the von Benda-Beckmanns’ book for the implementa-
tion of the 2014 Village Law is that the return to the nagari can only be understood as the
product of a long and very specific historical process in Minangkabau. It was stimulated
by a rare convergence of push factors for the return to the nagari: a well-established tradi-
tion of an elaborate set of customary institutions; the communal economic interests of
keeping rights to the communal land; the support of well-educated and well-connected
Minangkabau emigrants; the quality of the nagari as a symbol for ethnic pride; the capac-
ity to cause an adat-hype; and the positive cooperation from government officials at every
strategic level of administration. What we can also learn from the book is that the return
to the nagari has never been designed as a strategy for bringing government services
closer to the poor and disadvantaged, as was the goal in many campaigns for splitting dis-
tricts in other areas. Rather than studying the return to the nagari as a process of decen-
tralisation, the von Benda-Beckmanns chose to do something else: to analyse it as part of
the continuing story of balancing ‘the eternally contested and dynamic relations between
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Minangkabau adat, Islam and state law and authority’ (F. von Benda-Beckmann and K.
von Benda-Beckmann 2013, 6).
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Notes
1. When writing about Franz von Benda-Beckmann’s work on village government, one automati-
cally writes about the work by his wife Keebet as well, because they have always co-authored
the articles on this subject. We will, therefore, not try to make an artificial distinction between
their respective contributions to this field.
2. West Sumatra refers to the mainland area of this province, the region inhabited by the Minang-
kabau people, excluding the Mentawai islands that officially also belong to this province but
have a very different social and government structure.
3. Personal communication from Yando Zakaria, member of the Parliament’s Expert Team for
drafting the Village Law (15 November 2014).
4. It was the province to first suggest in the Elucidation to its Framework Regulation on Village
Government that the nagari wealth should be administered by the village government, and
not by the adat council (F. von Benda-Beckmann and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2013, 195).
Ironically, the return to the nagari thus decreased the powers of the adat council, at least
nominally.
5. On the same issue, see also Antl€ov (2003).
6. The historical background is that in the first half of the twentieth century, when missionaries
established the first schools on the island, they selected the sons of the nobility for higher edu-
cation. The government recruited administrators among these elite sons for governing the
island. The consequence was that there was no conflict of interests between state and adat, as
long as the Sumbanese government officials were able to channel the benefits from the state to
their home constituencies. Recognition of adat claims to land never was a problem as long as
the highest government officials belonged to the landed adat elites themselves. If land con-
flicts occurred, it was not a matter of state land versus adat land, but rather a conflict between
two adat claimants.
7. Schulte Nordholt and Van Klinken (2007, 19) conclude that the demands of localist identity
movements were often based on flimsy historical arguments, and that the real objective was to
increase the number of jobs in the bureaucracy for the campaigners’ ethnic constituency.
8. These very specific circumstances at a particular moment in time can be regarded and analysed
as a specific conjuncture: “the set of elements, processes, and relations that shaped people’s
lives at this time and place, and the political challenges that arise from that location”
(Li 2014, 4).
9. This is stipulated in the elucidation of article 72  2 of Law 6/2014.
10. http://finance.detik.com/read/2014/12/24/191301/2787058/4/jokowi-naikkan-dana-desa-122-
jadi-rp-20-triliun-di-2015 (last accessed 20-8-2015).
11. Article 20 of Government Regulation 60/2014.
12. See Art. 28 GR 43/2014.
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